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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of changes in foreign competition on the structure
of compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competition
as import penetration and use tariﬀs and exchange rates as instrumental variables to
estimate its causal eﬀect on pay. We ﬁnd that higher foreign competition leads to
more incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of pay
to performance. Second, it increases whithin-ﬁrm pay diﬀerentials between executive
levels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly because
they receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is also
associated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreign
competition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The structure of wages and compensation in the United States changed substantially over
the 1980s and 1990s: earnings inequality and returns to skill increased, with a particularly
dramatic rise in pay at the top of the wage distribution (Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor,
Katz and Kearney, 2006). The executive labor market replicated the trends for workers
in general, with inequality between executives and job mobility increasing, and CEO pay
going up disproportionately (Frydman, 2005). Simultaneously, ﬁrms increased their use of
incentives and performance-related pay (such as piece rates, bonuses, and stock options)
in the overall compensation of executives and workers (Murphy, 1999; Lemieux, MacLeod
and Parent, 2007), signiﬁcantly altering the structure of pay and the relative importance
of ﬁxed versus variable pay. This last fact has received much less attention, and there is
limited knowledge of the causes behind the changes in incentive contracts and compensation
structures inside ﬁrms.1 In this paper, we show that a major force behind some of these
changes is the increase in foreign competition resulting from reductions in trade barriers
and the globalization of economic activity.
A number of theoretical papers have shown that product market competition can directly
aﬀect the provision of incentives by ﬁrms in a principal-agent setting because of its impact
on proﬁts and, therefore, on the returns to eﬀort (Hermalin, 1992; Schmidt, 1997; Raith,
2004). The globalization of economic activity and trade is associated with a number of
phenomena —higher imports, reductions in trade barriers, lower costs of transport, and
information diﬀusion —all of which tend to increase the degree of competition that ﬁrms
face.2 While there are other sources of increased product market competition, in order
to identify a clear causal eﬀect that is not confounded by overall trends, we focus on a
particular channel through which competition may operate —namely, foreign competition,
measured as the degree of import penetration faced by U.S. ﬁrms. A common problem with
other standard measures of competition (such as Herﬁndahl indices and price-cost margins)
is that they are endogenous and diﬃcult to measure or interpret systematically across ﬁrms
over time, and that their levels are not necessarily indicative of the degree of competition
(Schmalensee 1989).
Import competition allows us to overcome some of these problems. To the extent that
1Murphy and Zabojnik (2004 a and b), Frydman (2005) and Gabaix and Landier (2006) provide a
rationale and evidence on the increase in total CEO pay.
2The term "globalization" is also sometimes used to refer to facts other than the increase in trade, such
as higher migration or FDI ﬂo w s ,a n de v e nt ot h et r e n dt o w a r d sc u l t u r al homogenization across countries.
Here, we restrict ourselves to its meaning as higher trade integration. See Tybout (2003) for a comprehensive
survey on the eﬀect of increased foreign competition on the decrease in domestic markups, and on the increase
in competition in general.
2it varies over time and across industries, we can assess how diﬀerent U.S. manufacturing
ﬁrms, with diﬀerent evolutions in their trade exposure in the 1990s, changed the incentive
structures they oﬀered their executives. Furthermore, in order to isolate ﬂuctuations in
foreign competition that are exogenous to the ﬁrms’ incentive policies and uncorrelated
with potential omitted variables, we use import tariﬀs and exchange rates as instrumental
variables.3
Compensation is measured using a matched employer-employee panel dataset (Execu-
comp) of large U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms, with ﬁve executives per ﬁrm between 1992 and
2000. It contains very detailed information on both ﬁrm characteristics and executive pay,
providing a fairly comprehensive picture of internal labor markets and incentive provision.
One can track executives as the extent of foreign competition faced by the ﬁrm evolves, and
evaluate how incentives change over time and across industries. Although we restrict the
analysis to changes in import penetration in order to be able to identify a precise causal
mechanism, the dataset allows us to be more general regarding the aspects of compensation
that we analyze. Incentives to exert eﬀort and to improve the manager´s contribution to the
productivity of the ﬁrm can be provided in several ways. Some are explicit and contractual,
such as agreeing on a bonus or a performance-related pay scheme. Others are implicit (with-
out an explicit written contract) and enforced on the basis of commitment and reputation.
These include discretionary bonuses or the commitment of the ﬁrm to a given promotion
scheme. Finally, some incentives may not be provided directly by ﬁrms but, rather, are
implicit in labor market conditions (e.g., the good performance of one executive in a given
ﬁrm may lead another ﬁrm to oﬀer this same executive a better job).4 We relate changes
in foreign competition to a number of wage and labor market outcomes, including ﬁxed
and variable pay, performance-pay sensitivities and within-ﬁrm wage diﬀerentials between
executive ranks. Furthermore, exploiting the panel dimension of the dataset, we are also
able to assess whether ﬁrms seek to hire more "able" or "talented" executives as foreign
competition changes (with talent measured as the permanent unobserved component of
wages). These measures, taken together, give us a good description of the wage structure
and the provision of incentives among top executives.
Our main ﬁnding is that higher foreign competition substantially changes the structure
of compensation: It reduces the level of non-performance-related pay and increases the
3We are able to compute the level of import penetration faced by the ﬁrm itself by taking into account
the fact that it may have products in diﬀerent four-digit SIC industries. Exchange rates and tariﬀsa r ea l s o
ﬁrm-speciﬁca n dw e i g h t e db yt h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo fe a c h currency (trading partner) in total industry
imports.
4See Prendergast (1999), Gibbons (2005) and Gibbons and Waldman (1999) for a broad survey of theo-
retical and empirical results on the diﬀerent channels for incentive provision.
3sensitivity of pay to performance, such that incentive provision is higher. This increase
in performance-pay sensitivities is more pronounced for the highest-paid executives: as
incentive provision goes up with foreign competition, wage diﬀerentials between executives
also increase. Finally, we also ﬁnd evidence the overall increase in wage diﬀerentials between
executives is driven partly by the fact that, faced with more competition, ﬁrms are hiring
more "talented" executives at the top.
Even though executives comprise a particular subsample of workers, they are an ideal
group in whcih to study performance-related pay because one has a clear measure of their
performance: ﬁrm performance as reﬂected by the stock market. Furthermore, this particu-
lar group of employees allows us to better identify the eﬀect of changes in foreign competition
on ﬁrm contracting behavior independent of its eﬀects on labor markets. This is because the
boundaries of labor and product markets are relatively independent when it comes to exec-
utives, who more frequently change ﬁrms between industries rather than within industries.5
Finally, even though executives constitute a very speciﬁc subset of highly-skilled workers,
they are representative of the higher end of the wage distribution, and understanding how
their contracts have evolved may shed light on the mechanisms behind the polarization of
earnings (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006). In fact, Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2007)
empirically establish the link between the growing use of performance-related pay and the
increase in wage inequality in the U.S. between the 1970s and 1990s. They argue that the
increase in performance-related pay accounts for nearly all of the increase in compensation
above the 20th percentile of the distribution. Our paper provides a causal explanation for
why the use of performance pay has increased.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the positive relationship between wage
inequality and trade openness. We show that foreign competition may aﬀect the provision
of incentives within ﬁrms in two ways that raise inequality: by increasing wage dispersion
within ﬁrms and through the use of performance-related pay. This is important because
most of the mechanisms explored to link inequality and trade have failed to fully account
for the overall positive correlation, including the eﬀects of openness on total labor supply,
total labor demand, skill-biased labor demand, and institutions (Slaughter, 1999). Here, we
suggest an additional mechanism.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri sa sf o l l o w s . I nS e c t i o n2 ,w ep r e s e n tt h em o t i v a t i o no ft h e
paper and the related literature; Section 3 presents the data used; Section 4.1 shows the
5For example, 71 percent of the transitions of executives between ﬁrms included in Execucomp are between
sectors when they are deﬁned at a four-digit SIC code level (64 percent when deﬁned at a three-digit level).
Moreover, collective bargaining is virtually non-existent among executives. Therefore, it is unlikely that
individual executives internalize the eﬀect of their joint compensation packages on ﬁrm proﬁts.
4speciﬁcation and the results relative to ﬁxed and variable pay; Section 4.2 presents the
results on promotion ladders; Section 4.3 explores how ﬁrms demand talent diﬀerently
according to the degree of foreign competition; Section 4.4 presents the results on turnover;
and Section 5 provides an overall picture and concludes.
2 Background and Related Literature
The trend towards globalization of trade and the increase in foreign competition imply
that ﬁrms are increasingly exposed to competitive pressure (Tybout, 2003). An increase in
import penetration in an industry means that domestic ﬁrms face more competition because
goods from foreign ﬁrms have a bigger presence in the market. Furthermore, changes in
foreign competition can permanently reshape the general competitive conﬁguration of an
industry —in the presence of ﬁxed entry costs, once foreign ﬁr m sd e c i d et oe x p o r ti n t oa
market, they are unlikely to exit.6 Therefore, one can think of the increase in foreign
competition as an increase in competitive pressure for the industry.
A number of hteoretical papers have examined the eﬀect of competition on incentive
provision within the principal-agent framework (e.g., Schmidt, 1997; Raith, 2003; Vives,
2004). A general result in most competition models is that, with more competition, the
residual demand that a ﬁrm faces becomes more elastic and shifts down.7 This generates
two counteracting eﬀects in terms of incentives: on the one hand, more competition raises
the reward to market stealing activities due to the higher elasticity of market shares to
productivity diﬀerentials. Everything else equal, this implies a higher marginal return to
managerial and workers’ eﬀort and leads ﬁrms to introduce steeper incentive packages. On
the other hand, the residual demand that a ﬁrm faces shrinks, reducing markups and the
proﬁtability/value of a given market share, thus making market stealing less attractive.
This leads the ﬁrm to reduce the steepness of its incentive contracts. The composition of
these two opposing forces implies that, a priori, the overall eﬀect is ambiguous.
However, when one allows for endogenous entry of ﬁrms into the industry, since ﬁrm
proﬁts are constant and dictated by a zero-proﬁt condition, the second eﬀect is not present.
Raith (2003) models competition and incentive pay allowing for free entry and exit of ﬁrms
and shows that, in that case, competition, measured as increased elasticity of substitution
or larger market size that leads to further entry, always leads to an increase in the provision
of incentives. The eﬀect is, however, reversed when competition increases due to a fall in
entry costs.
6See Baldwin (1988), Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989).
7See Vives (2004) and Boone (2000) for an overview of these two eﬀects.
5Competition may also have other eﬀects on ﬁrms. For instance, it may aﬀect implicit
incentives to the extent that it increases the risk of the ﬁrm going bankrupt, and, lead
workers to exert more eﬀort to avoid losing their job, thus reducing the need for the ﬁrm
to provide explicit incentives. Schmidt (1997) explicitly models this incentive, and several
empirical papers (Nickell, 1996; Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz, 2002) show that if additional
competition leads to more pressure on proﬁts, employees tend to work harder.
An increase in competition also may increase the available information about market
conditions and help ﬁrms to better assess the contribution of an executive to proﬁts (Hart,
1983; Scharfstein, 1988; Hermalin, 1992). This may lead to a change in the steepness of
incentive schemes and, more generally, to increased use of relative-performance evaluation.
However, this literature makes no clear predictions regarding the eﬀect of competition on
the provision of incentives based on a ﬁrm’s own performance.
Overall, the total eﬀect of competition on incentive pay is theoretically ambiguous, which
makes this an interesting empirical question.8 Our analysis asks: what is the net eﬀect that
dominates empirically?
To the extent that ﬁrms can increase performance (cut marginal costs of production)
either by inducing more eﬀort or by hiring a more skilled/talented manager, many of the
arguments for rewarding managerial eﬀort are also valid for rewarding skill (Guadalupe„
2007) and managerial talent. Marin and Verdier (2003) present a model in which globaliza-
tion aﬀects the hierarchical structure of the ﬁrm and the reward for talent. Firms change
their hierarchical structure —and, thus, the explicit and implicit incentives that executives
face— and increase their demand for talented CEOs. Murphy and Zabojnik (2004 a and
b) and Frydman (2005) argue that the increase in CEO pay is due to higher demand for
general skills; and Gabaix and Landier (2008) suggest that the increase in ﬁrm size has
increased the impact of CEO skills and, therefore, that small diﬀerences in skill can lead to
larger diﬀerences in compensation. Our analysis is complementary to theirs since foreign
competition could be an additional reason for why general skills are more important, and
for which small diﬀerences in talent matter more. We also analyze explicitly the empiri-
cal eﬀect of competition on within-ﬁrm inequality (section 4.2) and the reward for talent
(section 4.3).9
8There is surprisingly little empirical evidence on the eﬀects of competition on incentive provision within
the ﬁrm. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) ﬁnd evidence, for U.K. workers and managers, that competition,
induced by a sharp currency appreciation, raised performance-pay sensitivities. Cuñat and Guadalupe
(2008) use banking deregulation waves in the 90s in the U.S. to show that deregulated sectors used more
performance-related pay.
9A related argument on globalization and pay can be found in Feenstra and Hanson (1997). They show
that an increase in foreign direct investment increases the returns to skill in Mexican ﬁrms.
6The present paper is related to several others that associate foreign competition with
the level of wages for regular workers. For workers in general, there is evidence that higher
foreign competition leads to higher unemployment and lower wages (Revenga, 1992), and
to a replacement of implicit contracts by spot contracting (Bertrand, 2004). There is also
evidence of rent sharing between workers and ﬁrms. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) using
Canadian data, and Abowd and Allain (1996) and Kramarz (2006) using French data, ﬁnd
a positive elasticity of salaries to ﬁrms’ quasi-rents, when the latter are instrumented using
shocks to foreign competition. The idea behind these articles is that foreign competition
exogenously modiﬁes the rents available to be split in the industry and, therefore, aﬀects
collective-bargaining conditions and labor market institutions. Our article departs from
this perspective because, in the case of executives higher mobility across sectors means
that the relevant labor market is not well deﬁned at a sector level. For this reason labor
market considerations and changes to labor market institutions are less likely to play a role
in our identiﬁcation. At the same time, issues related to product market competition and
governance may be more relevant (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005; Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001).
This paper also diﬀers from the ones mentioned above because we study not only pay
levels, but also changes in the structure of compensation within ﬁrms (ﬁxed pay versus
performance-related pay), changes in wage diﬀerentials between executives, and the demand
for talent. To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that systematically explores how
all these aspects of employment contracts have changed over time with competition. We also
extend the identiﬁcation strategy in Bertrand (2004) by using tariﬀs as an additional instru-
ment for import penetration and by calculating ﬁrm-speciﬁc import penetration, exchange
rates, and tariﬀs.
3D a t a
3.1 Compensation Data
We use the Standard&Poor’s Execucomp dataset. This is a panel (starting in 1992) of all
ﬁrms in the S&P 1500 index.10 Each ﬁrm reports detailed yearly information on the pay
structure of the ﬁve most highly paid executives in the ﬁrm (ranked by salary and bonus), as
well as some individual characteristics of the executives. The data also contain information
from ﬁnancial statements on ﬁrm characteristics and performance. For our purposes, one
unique feature of this data is that they allow us to follow ﬁrms and executives over time, in
10The index includes ﬁrms in the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices, so it
represents a stratiﬁed sample of listed ﬁrms of all sizes.
7a panel setting. We use yearly data from 1992 to 2000 for all manufacturing sectors. The
Execucomp data start in 1992, and 2000 is the last year for which we are able to compute
import penetration. And we have trade data for the manufacturing sector. This leaves us
with 831 ﬁrms and 7,571 executives (25,146 unique observations).
From these data, we use a comprehensive measure of total yearly compensation for
each executive, including the components of pay that are related to performance and those
that are not. Our measure of total compensation is the natural logarithm of the sum of
salary, bonus, total value of stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes
formula), total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other
annual compensation.11
3.2 Discussion of Foreign Competition and its Instruments: Identiﬁcation
The data analysis in the next section evaluates the eﬀect of lagged foreign competition
(ImportPenfjt−1) for ﬁrm f in industry j at time t − 1, on a number of aspects of indi-
vidual i’s compensation and incentives.12 To evaluate the eﬀect of import penetration and,





where Wifjt is total compensation and v0
ifjt are control variables such as ﬁrm size or CEO
status, and the variables included in Xifjt (ﬁrm performance, pay-rank dummies) depend
on the outcome of interest. We allow for diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the error term uifjt that
include ﬁrm or ﬁrm-speciﬁc individual ﬁxed eﬀects (see each individual model below). The
measure of import penetration ImportPenfjt−1 used in what follows is deﬁned at the ﬁrm
level and takes into account that a ﬁrm may operate in diﬀerent industries. Standard errors
are clustered by ﬁrm in all speciﬁcations (to allow for autocorrelation of the error term
within ﬁrms across years, since the import penetration variable is deﬁned at the ﬁrm level).
To derive this ﬁrm-speciﬁc measure of import penetration, we ﬁrst deﬁne industry-level
import penetration as imports (into the four-digit SIC market), divided by the total value
of internal production plus imports, and take its deviation with respect to the industry
mean for all years. This measures the extent to which foreign competitors are present
11This is the standard measure of total executive compensation as described in Murphy (1999), and Jensen
and Murphy (1990) among many others.
12We evaluated whether ﬁrms respond more to contemporaneous or lagged imports in setting contracts
by including both variables in our regressions. Even though, when introduced separately, they are both
signiﬁcant, we found that, when considered together, lagge di m p o r t si sw h a td r i v e st h er e s u l t s ,s ow eu s e
lagged imports in all our analysis.
8in the domestic market. Taking the deviation and including industry dummies in all the
regressions ensures that c γ2 does not capture unobserved diﬀerences by industry that are
correlated with import penetration. Over the sample period, average import penetration
goes from 0.16 to 0.20, but it increases for some sectors and decreases for others such that,
in any given year, one may ﬁnd a rich combination of changes for diﬀerent sectors. As an
example, Figure 1 shows this variation for three selected industries.
However, since many ﬁrms sell goods in more than one industry, import penetration
into the ﬁrm’s main industry may be a misleading measure of the actual import penetra-
tion that the ﬁrm faces. To account for this, we deﬁne a ﬁrm-speciﬁci m p o r tp e n e t r a t i o n
measure, ImportPenfjt−1, as the weighted average of the industry-level import penetra-
tion (computed as above), where the weights are constructed as the fraction of total sales
associated with each SIC4 industry in which the ﬁrm operates (declared business segments
from Compustat Segments data).13 Because the industries in which the ﬁrm operates may
change endogenously over time, the weights are based on the ﬁrm’s operations in 1991 (pre-
sample). Here, the identiﬁcation arises from import penetration changing within a ﬁrm
over time. The advantage of this choice is that it is a good reﬂection of the ﬁrm’s indus-
tries of operation and is immune to endogenous production decisions. The disadvantage is
twofold. First, if ﬁrms tend to radically change their industries of operation, by the end of
the sample, and given the ﬁxed 1991 weights, variations in this measure may not be highly
correlated with the actual import penetration that the ﬁrm faces in a particular year; and
second, the segment weights can introduce measurement error.14
Notice that we will be exploiting the panel nature of the dataset, such that we can include
ﬁrm and individual ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, no matter
how rich the variation of import penetration is in the panel, its use still can be subject to
a number of criticisms in terms of possible endogeneity problems. For example, reverse
causality may arise if changes in compensation structure drive the behavior of executives
and, therefore, the degree of competition in the market (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999) and
the extent to which foreign ﬁrms enter. Further, if ﬁrms anticipate import ﬂuctuations,
actual changes in a given year may under-estimate their eﬀective reaction. Finally, our
weighted import penetration may be measured with error, thus leading to attenuation bias.
For all of these reasons, our results on the eﬀect of import penetration may be biased
13While 56 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample declare only one segment, 17 percent declare two, 15 percent
declare three, and 8 percent declare four. Only 3 percent declare ﬁve or more.
14The results are not substantially diﬀerent if we use "running" ﬁrm-speciﬁc weights (where the weights
vary as the ﬁrm changes its product mix), suggesting that the changes in business mix have a limited eﬀect.
We also ran all of the speciﬁcations where each ﬁrm is assigned to its primary SIC4 code, and our results
—albeit smaller in magnitude— were qualitatively similar to the ones using the ﬁrm-based variable.
9towards zero. To deal with these endogeneity concerns, we use exchange rates and import
tariﬀs as instrumental variables.
We construct industry-speciﬁc import-weighted exchange rates (Bertrand, 2004) and
tariﬀs, where the weights on the bilateral exchange rates and tariﬀs between the U.S.
and its trading partners are the share of imports from each partner country in a base year
(average of 1990-1991 for exchange rates and 1993 for tariﬀs). By choosing static weights, we
avoid any possible endogeneity that could arise from the joint determination of the import
weights and exchange rates or tariﬀs. We use both current and one-lag exchange rates,
as well as lagged tariﬀs.15 The ﬁnal instruments are calculated at the ﬁrm level using the
(ﬁxed) weights from the Compustat segments data, as we did with the import penetration
measure.
Table 2 shows the ﬁrst stage in the paper. Column 1 regresses the ﬁrm-weighted measure
of import penetration on current and lagged weighted exchange rates, using one observation
per ﬁrm and year (and controlling for ﬁrm size, year dummies and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects). It
shows that a dollar appreciation signiﬁcantly reduces import penetration in the same year
and one year later.16 Column 2 replaces exchange rates with lagged tariﬀsa n ds h o w s
that import penetration is lower the higher the tariﬀ r a t e . T h e s er e g r e s s i o n sa r ea tt h e
base of our IV strategy. To provide two-stage least-squares estimates of equation 1, both
ImportPenfjt−1 and ImportPenfjt−1∗Xifjt must be instrumented. Given an instrumental
variable vector for import penetration Zfjt (that, in our case, includes the current and
lagged source-weighted exchange rate, as well as lagged tariﬀs), the instruments are Zfjt
and Zfjt ∗ Xifjt. These regressions are shown in columns 4 (where Xifjt are pay-rank
dummies —the interaction of pay-rank dummies and the instruments is not reported), 5 and
6( w h e r eXifjt is log ﬁrm performance).
F o ra ni n s t r u m e n tt ob ev a l i d ,i tm u s tb ee x o g e n o u sa n ds a t i s f yt h ee x c l u s i o nr e s t r i c t i o n .
To the extent that exchange rates are determined in international ﬁnancial markets, and
tariﬀs are determined either at trade negotiation rounds or by federal policy, they are
possibly uncorrelated with ﬁrms’ compensation policy and, therefore, arguably exogenous.17
15Note that exchange rates are superior to other measures, such as terms of trade, because the latter
also includes domestic prices. Domestic prices are arguably not exogenous to executives’ decisions and
are also correlated —just like compensation— with general demand shocks, thus not satisfying the exclusion
restriction. By constructing our instruments using aggregate exchange rates and ﬁxed weights, we do not
capture sector-speciﬁc demand shocks. Aggregate shocks shou l db ec a p t u r e db yt h ey e a rd u m m i e s .
16We found that it signiﬁcantly raises imports with a two-year lag, which reﬂects the J-curve eﬀect
discussed in the trade literature (unreported).
17Tariﬀ data come from the UNCTAD TRAINS dataset (available from 1993 to 2000 for the U.S.) that
contains scheduled tariﬀs. Scheduled tariﬀs are superior to calculated average tariﬀs (available in the NBER
database) to prevent the instrument from being mechanically correlated with imports. Since calculated aver-
10One might still be concerned about endogeneity of tariﬀs if executives could lobby for
increases in tariﬀs when imports go up. However, over this period, most of the tariﬀ
variation occurs around 1995, when the Uruguay round was implemented. This can be seen
in Figure 2, which shows a 36 percent drop in tariﬀs after the Uruguay round for ﬁrms in
our sample. The exogeneity of the trade liberalization and the use of lagged tariﬀs alleviates
the concern of tariﬀ endogeneity. One advantage of using both sets of instruments is that
the over-identifying restriction can be tested using two very diﬀerent sources of variation
in imports. In the Hansen-Sargan over-identiﬁcation test, we cannot reject the joint null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments (in Column 4, Hansen J-statistic has
a P-value of 0.42). The tests for the joint signiﬁcance of the endogenous regressors (both the
classic F-test and the modiﬁed Anderson-Rubin test) show that they are highly signiﬁcant
jointly.18
Using static import weights helps in addressing the exclusion restriction since they
increase the explanatory power of exchange rates and tariﬀs for imports and reduces their
explanatory power for potential confounding factors (to the extent that the ﬁrm weights are
uncorrelated with these other factors). In fact, we ﬁnd that import-weighted exchange rates
and tariﬀs are poorly related to export openness (that is, exports over total production at
four-digit SIC, demeaned by industry) (see Column 2 of Table 2). This suggests that the
instrumented regressions are unlikely to be capturing an indirect eﬀect through changes in
exports, which lends some support to the exclusion restriction.
All of trade information comes from the NBER database19 and the tariﬀ information
from the UNCTAD TRAINS dataset. Total production at the industry level comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis Industry Shipments data. Further details of all the vari-
ables and their construction can be found in the Appendix. Since tariﬀ data are available
only from 1993 onwards, and because we use lagged tariﬀs, our instrumented regressions
eﬀectively cover the period 1994-2000.20
age tariﬀs are measured as duties paid over total import value by industry and year, and import penetration
is calculated from the same total import value, any measurement error on tariﬀs would mechanically improve
the ﬁt on the instrumented variable, and not necessarily through changes in actual tariﬀ rates, which is the
variation we want.
18Notice, though, that, since the partial R-squared is far from one, even if the instruments satisfy the
exogeneity and the exclusion restrictions, there is a lot of variation in import penetration that remains
unexplained, such that the IV coeﬃcients may diﬀer substantially from the OLS results.
19"US Imports, Exports and Tariﬀ Data, 1989-2001 (NBER 9387)." See Feenstra et al (2002) for a detailed
description of the construction of each of these variables.
20We present results using all observations for which we have data available (from 1992 in the OLS
speciﬁcations and from 1994 in the instrumented regressions). Similar results were obtained when restricting
t h es a m p l ei na l lt h es p e c i ﬁcations to post-1994 .
11Even though globalization is a pervasive trend, the eﬀect identiﬁed here is deliberately
much narrower and focuses only on import penetration, so that we can conﬁdently say
something about causality. Focusing on this narrow channel using the panel and instru-
mental variables has the advantage that we know where the variation is coming from, and it
provides a clear channel for the eﬀect. However, there are many other reasons why compe-
tition may change, and foreign competition is just one that we can easily identify, measure,
and ﬁnd instrumental variables for. U.S. ﬁrms have also experienced the pressure of market
deregulation, direct entry of domestic and foreign ﬁrms into the market, and reductions in
information and communication costs. While these may be important, our identiﬁcation
strategy remains silent about these channels.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Pay Structure
Executive pay typically has a part that is ﬁxed and a component that is related to perfor-
mance. Therefore, in order to estimate the eﬀect of foreign competition on the structure
of compensation, we model incentive contracts as follows. Total compensation for each
executive i in ﬁrm f, in industry j, in year t, can be written as
ln(Wifjt)=a0 + a1ImportPenfjt−1 + b0 lnPerf ft+ b1ImportPenfjt−1 ∗ lnPerf ft+
+v0
ifjtβ + dt + df + ηi +  ifjt
(2)
The dependent variable ln(Wifjt) is a comprehensive measure of compensation; lnPerf ft
is ﬁrm performance measured as the logarithm of the total market value of the ﬁrm, when
this value includes the reinvestment of dividends and excludes mergers, share buyouts, spin-
oﬀs ,a n ds e a s o n e de q u i t yo ﬀerings.21 22 The variable ImportPenfjt−1 is lagged import
penetration deﬁned as in the previous section; vifjt includes other determinants of pay
structure such as ﬁrm size (logarithm of assets), and a CEO dummy; dt and df are time
and ﬁrm dummies; ηi are individual ﬁxed eﬀects; and  ifjt is a white noise.23
The coeﬃcient b a0 captures the baseline ﬁxed component of the incentive contract, and
b b0 its variable component, which is a function of performance. Since all regressions include
21This speciﬁcation is similar to the ones in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Murphy (1986) among
others.
22Given that the estimation includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects this performance measure is equivalent to using the
log of total annual shareholder returns including dividends.
23Unfortunately, the data contain only limited biographical information about the executives. Data items
such as gender, age, or tenure are available for only a subset of individuals. The ﬁxed-eﬀect regression will
capture gender, education, and other time-invariant characteristics.
12ﬁrm (and individual) dummies, the estimated coeﬃcient b b0 captures the baseline elasticity
of pay to ﬁrm performance, or the percentage change in compensation from a percentage
change in ﬁrm performance. The main coeﬃcients of interest are b a1, which measures the
eﬀect of foreign competition on the ﬁxed component of pay, and b b1, which captures the
diﬀerential slope of the performance-related-pay agreement with respect to diﬀerent levels
of import penetration.24 Ideally, one would like to have direct measures of b0 and b1, but
these are not available, even when we have detailed information on the diﬀerent compo-
nents of compensation (salary, bonus, etc.), because even though salaries are conventionally
considered ﬁxed, raises and promotions are performance-related. And, while bonuses are
considered variable, executive contracts often have a guaranteed (e.g., sign-in) bonus or a
minimum bonus (Murphy, 1999). So, estimating equation 2 lets the data speak and pro-
vides us with direct estimates of the ﬁxed component and the slope of the incentive contract.
Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm level.
Table 3 shows the eﬀect of foreign competition on performance-pay sensitivities. In-
creases in import penetration are generally associated with a lower ﬁxed component of
pay ( b a1 < 0) and a variable component of pay that is more sensitive to ﬁrm performance
(b b1 > 0).
Column 1 includes ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, while columns 2 to 7 include ﬁrm-speciﬁc individual
ﬁxed eﬀects, so that results are identiﬁed from within ﬁrm and individual changes in pay, not
from individuals moving between ﬁrms with diﬀerent compensation structures.25 Columns
1 to 5 pool all executives, and Columns 6 and 7 restrict the analysis to CEOs. The eﬀect
of import penetration is sizeable. For all executives (column 2), a one standard deviation
increase in (within-ﬁrm) import penetration generates an average drop in ﬁxed pay of 8.8
(0.02*4.38) percent and an increase in the sensitivity of pay to performance of 1.7 percentage
24We evaluated whether systematic changes in imports, exchange rates or tariﬀso nﬁrm proﬁts could be
driving the results. This can arise if, for example, rent extraction is a signiﬁcant determinant of pay, and
executives are paid for changes in ﬁrm value beyond the contribution of their eﬀort (an eﬀect known as "pay-
for-luck", as in Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Similarly, if log pay were a concave transformation of
returns (as with some bonus schemes) or a convex one (as in options), then any systematic eﬀect of exchange
rates or tariﬀso nﬁrm value would change the sensitivity of pay to performance. We instrumented the
performance measure with our instrumental variables (tariﬀs and exchange rates), and found no signiﬁcant
relationship between the unexpected component of performance and pay, suggesting that it is unlikely
that changes in incentives are driven by systematic changes in performance associated with the shocks to
competition.
25In this case, the ﬁrm and the individual eﬀects are not separately identiﬁed, but this does not aﬀect
the other coeﬃcients. We found very similar results when controlling for individual and ﬁrm eﬀects sepa-
rately. The results are also robust to including interaction between Import Pen* lnPerf with ﬁrm/individual
dummies.
13points (0.02*0.85), or 6.8 percent relative to the baseline sensitivity (0.017/0.25).26 For
CEOs only (column 6), the changes are even larger and correspond to a 14.4 percent fall in
ﬁxed pay and a 2.5 percentage point increase in the sensitivity of pay to performance.
Column 3 includes a large set of additional controls to allow for the possibility that
compensation may be changing for reasons other than competitive pressure. Our basic
result could be driven by changes in the demand for labor if foreign competition leads
to an increase in the demand for skilled (and, therefore, managerial) labor. To control
for this, we include a set of variables that will likely capture this increased demand for
skills. These are the log of property plant and equipment, investment over assets and
the log of the number of employees. We also control for other determinants of executive
compensation as in Himmelberg et al. (1999) (these are log of sales, the ratio of long-term
assets to sales, operating income to sales, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and the ratio
of capital expenditures to property plant and equipment). The main result is unaltered by
the inclusion of these variables, but since many of them are potentially outcome variables
themselves, we omit them in what follows.
To allow for the base sensitivity of pay-to-performance to change over time for all ﬁrms,
and for diﬀerent sensitivities across industries, in columns 4 and 5, we interact the perfor-
mance measure with year dummies and with industry dummies. We also allow for industry-
speciﬁc trends in pay levels (column 4), and, ﬁnally, we include industry-speciﬁc trends in
performance (column 5), with results similar to column 2 and coeﬃcients also similar in
magnitude. This highly saturated model alleviates the concern that all we are capturing
are concurrent trends in imports and incentives, since it identiﬁes not only from within ﬁrm
and individual variation in performance-pay sensitivities, but also from deviations from the
industry-speciﬁc parametric trends (in levels and slopes).
We ﬁnd that more competition leads to steeper incentives, so, to the extent that com-
petition is likely to depress the average rent of ﬁrms, this result is at odds with some of the
rent-extraction literature, in which rent extraction is camouﬂaged in the variable compo-
nent of pay, and executives appear to get paid for luck (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Bertrand
and Mullainathan, 2001). If present, the rent-extraction mechanism actually would tend to
reduce the size of our incentive-related coeﬃcients, thus pushing our results downwards.27
In terms of the magnitude of these eﬀects, while import penetration increased by 6
26The standard deviation of import penetration in our sample is 0.14, but this includes both the between-
and within-ﬁrm deviation. The origin-weighted within-ﬁrm standard deviation is 0.02.
27More generally, we tested explicitly for the possibility that a systematic eﬀect of changes in imports,
exchange rates or tariﬀso nﬁrm proﬁts could be driving the results (for instance, in the presence of non-
linearities in performance pay-elasticities), and could ﬁnd no evidence for this hypothesis. Results available
upon request.
14percentage points in the economy over our sample period, in our sample, average (origin-
weighted, ﬁrm-speciﬁc) import penetration increased by 4.3 percentage points. This implies,
using the results in column 6, a fall in the level of compensation of 23 percent (0.043*4.54)
and an increase in the slope of 3.5 percent (0.043*0.81), or around 14 percent of the baseline.
Because potential endogeneity is always a concern in these regressions —either because
diﬀerent pay structures lead to management strategies that may preempt foreign competi-
tion or because both may be co-determined by some omitted variable— we go on to provide
instrumental variable results in Table 4. Since the sample size is reduced because of the
limited availability of tariﬀ data for the early part of our sample, we present the OLS results
on the IV sample in column 1 for comparability and show that they are quite similar.
Column 2 presents the basic IV results. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of a one standard
deviation increase in import penetration coming from changes in the exchange rate and
tariﬀs is to reduce the average intercept by 3.6 percentage points (0.02*1.8) and to increase
the slope of contracts by 4.7 (0.02*2.37) percentage points. For CEOs (column 6), the
intercept falls by 13.4 percent, and pay sensitivity increases by 5.9 percentage points.
The IV estimate for the slope of the contract is larger than the OLS equivalent, which,
as mentioned earlier, is not surprising, given that all the sources of bias mentioned would
tend to attenuate the coeﬃcient. The estimated eﬀect for the intercept is not signiﬁcant
in column 2, but it becomes so when we account for secular trends in the fully saturated
speciﬁcation of column 3. In this last model (Column 3), the point estimates are larger,
and three times larger than in the corresponding OLS regression (Column 6 of Table 3).
Columns 4 and 5 show the results when using only one instrument at a time (exchange
rates or tariﬀs, respectively). Qualitatively similar results obtain, although with diﬀerent
point estimates (suggesting a diﬀerent local treatment eﬀect). If one had a preference for
one instrument over the other, it is worth underscoring that our results are not qualitatively
diﬀerent if we use just one set of instrumental variables.
Overall, Tables 3 and 4 show an important result: when ﬁrms face additional foreign
competition, their pay structure shifts towards more performance-related pay and less ﬁxed
pay. That is, competition leads to an increase in incentives, and ﬁrms shift the diﬀerent
components of pay in a way that should induce executives to increase ﬁrm performance.
This is true both if we control for individual ﬁxed eﬀects and if we saturate the model
with interactions of year and industry dummies with performance. The use of instrumental
variables deals with the endogeneity concerns and allows us to conﬁrm that the causality
of this eﬀect goes from foreign competition to pay, not the other way around.
154.2 The Wage Ladder
Incentives can be provided through performance-pay contracts, as in the previous section,
but also directly with pay levels, through eﬃciency wages, or wage diﬀerentials between
executives in tournament-like mechanisms.28 This section analyzes the net eﬀect of import
penetration on total compensation, and on wage diﬀerentials between executives within a
ﬁrm: the wage ladder. Unfortunately, we do not have a precise description of job titles or
promotion proﬁles, and our data are insuﬃcient to assess potential changes in organizational
structure induced by competition, such as "delayering" (Rajan and Wulf, 2006), but we are
able to analyze the pay hierarchy.
To measure changes in the wage ladder, we rank each executive within the ﬁrm according
to total compensation in a given year, as in Barron and Waddell (2003). We construct ﬁve
dummy variables, hk with k ∈ {1,2,..,5}, where h1 takes value 1 if the executive is the
highest-paid executive in the ﬁrm in a given year and zero otherwise; h2 takes value 1 if the
executive is the second-highest-paid executive in the ﬁrm in that year; and so on up to h5.








ifjtχ + dt + df + ηi +  ifjt (3)
w h e r et h ev a r i a b l e sa r ea sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n4 . 1 .T h ec o e ﬃcients βk represent the average
wage diﬀerential between the highest- and the kth highest-paid executive. Given that the
pay measure is in logs, these diﬀerentials should be interpreted as total pay ratios between
executives. Therefore, they do not capture the fact that pay increased for all executives
during the period. The coeﬃcients of interest are θk, a measure of the change in these
diﬀerentials with competition. If the diﬀerence in pay between executives increases with
ImportPenfjt−1, we would expect to ﬁnd that θk is negative and decreases in k (increases
in absolute value); this indicates that the wage diﬀerentials are more marked with high
foreign competition, conditional on controls and unobserved heterogeneity. The inclusion of
individual ﬁxed eﬀects in these regressions implies that the estimated diﬀerences between
pay levels, βk, are not attributable to the diﬀerent abilities of executives in the hierarchy.
That is, if the highest-paid worker (k =1 )receives a higher wage than the others (reﬂected
by βk < 0), it is not because he or she is the most talented individual since unobserved
ability, which we can think of as "talent," is accounted for in the ﬁxed eﬀect. We present and
discuss the results with and without individual ﬁxed eﬀects. Section 4.3 exploits information
in the individual ﬁxed eﬀects about the "talent" of the executives that ﬁrms hire and how
28Eriksson (1999) and Main et al. (1993) study wage diﬀerentials and the tournament nature of executive
promotions as a way to provide incentives
16this changes with competition.
Table 5 shows the results of this speciﬁcation. Before studying the eﬀects of import
penetration on wage diﬀerentials within the ﬁrm, we analyze the wage ladder itself (co-
eﬃcients of variables second, third, fourth and ﬁfth —the omitted category is always the
highest-paid executive). The coeﬃcients are all negative and increasing in absolute value
as one goes down the wage ladder.29 A comparison of columns 1 (with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects)
and 2 (with ﬁrm*individual ﬁxed eﬀects) shows that the wage ladder is less steep when one
controls for individual unobserved heterogeneity: the diﬀerence between the top and the
ﬁfth executive is reduced by two thirds (from -1.27 to -0.88) when controlling for diﬀerences
in individual ability. This indicates that one of the reasons for existing wage diﬀerentials
among executives is that workers with diﬀerent ability levels occupy diﬀerent levels in the
hierarchy. However, ability (talent) is only part of the explanation, since column 2 still
shows signiﬁcant and sizable diﬀerences between the diﬀerent levels. Therefore, "advancing
in the pay hierarchy" is associated with a wage increase and, thus, may provide, in itself,
incentives.
Regarding import penetration, the results on b θ2 to b θ5 show how imports aﬀect the dif-
ferential between executive levels, net of all characteristics that are controlled for in Xifjt,
and individual unobserved heterogeneity. The coeﬃcients b θ2 to b θ5 are generally negative
and increasing in absolute value. As import penetration increases, the wage schedule be-
comes steeper, with the highest-paid executive earning proportionally more than the second-
highest-paid executive, and so on, for all 5 categories. Again, the eﬀect is non-negligible: for
the highest-paid executive, and once we account for ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity (column
1), a single standard deviation (0.02 percent) increase in foreign competition increases total
p a yb y4 . 7p e r c e n ta n dt h ed i ﬀerential between the ﬁrst- and ﬁfth-highest-paid executive by
2.6 percent. These numbers drop to 3.4 and (a not signiﬁcant) 1.6 percent when controlling
for unobserved individual and ﬁrm heterogeneity (column 2). Comparing columns 1 and 2
shows that the increase in the top executive pay with imports is higher if we do not include
individual ﬁxed eﬀects (in column 1) and that much of the changes in diﬀerential change
between levels due to competition is reduced when we account for individual unobserved
heterogeneity. This suggests that some of the changes in total compensation are driven by
individual characteristics, as a result of ﬁrms in more competitive industries hiring more
skilled/talented CEOs. This is even more true when we account for diﬀerential trends in
pay by industry in column 3.
29This is by construction, as the dependent variable (log total compensation) is used to rank the executives:
the coeﬃcients on the dummies reﬂect the percentage diﬀerence from the highest-paid executive in total
compensation.
17Next, since OLS may be biased downwards and to assess the causal eﬀect of foreign
competition, we use instrumental variables as before (columns 5 to 8).30 They yield a
pattern similar to that in columns 1 to 3, although the magnitude of the eﬀects, (but
also the standard errors) is larger. When only accounting for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd
a large and signiﬁcant increase in pay for all executives, but the increase is substantially
larger for the highest-paid executive, such that pay diﬀerentials inside the ﬁrm grow, even
when accounting for secular industry trends in pay (column 6). Total pay and wage
diﬀerentials between executives also increase with instrumented imports for all executives
when we control for individual unobserved heterogeneity, although the increases are smaller
in magnitude (column 7). These are reduced further when controlling for industry trends
(column 8), and we ﬁnd that, accounting for individual*ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and industry trends
in pay, a one standard deviation increase in import penetration leads to a 21.8 (0.02*10.89)
percent increase in pay for the highest-paid executive, and to a 9.2 or 12.1 percent increase
for the third- and fourth-highest-paid. Therefore, the IV regressions indicate that total pay
went up at all levels, but more at the top, such that there was a signiﬁcant change in wage
diﬀerentials within ﬁrms and that part of it was driven by changes in workers’ skill.31
However, in light of the results in the previous section on incentive contracts, we expect
changes in total pay to be a mixture of workers getting diﬀerent levels of ﬁxed pay and
diﬀerent performance-pay-sensitivities that induce diﬀerent levels of eﬀort. Thus, to provide
a better interpretation of the mechanism behind the steepening of the wage ladder and
within ﬁrm inequality, we investigate how, with foreign competition, the slope and level of
pay changed the diﬀerent levels of the pay hierarchy. Table 6 reports the results. First,
it shows that the baseline performance-pay-sensitivity is higher for executives closer to the
top (elasticity of 0.25 for the most highly paid versus 0.22 for the ﬁfth executive in column
1), which is consistent with the idea that the marginal contribution to ﬁrm performance is
higher the higher up in the hierarchy the worker is (this is in line with results in Barron
and Waddell, 2003). Next, it shows that these performance pay sensitivities increased more
with competition for top executives (interaction of pay-rank dummies, performance and
import penetration) and that the level of ﬁxed pay also falls more for top executives with
additional imports (interaction of pay-rank dummies and imports).
In sum, these results indicate that the ratio of the total pay of an executive to the total
30Column 4 shows the OLS results on the restricted IV sample.
31Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Frydman (2005) suggest that the increase in the level of CEO pay
is the result of increased demand for general human capital or managerial talent. Our results complement
their work since we provide evidence for changes in the observed distribution of talent at the top of the ﬁrm
and are able to systematically test whether competition is one reason for this increase in the demand for
managerial ability.
18pay of the next-lower-paid executive grows with foreign competition (Table 5), partly as
a result of incentive contracts becoming steeper as the executive climbs within the ﬁrm
(Table 6), and possibly from the higher eﬀort exerted with more high-powered incentives.
It also implies that there may be higher rewards for an internal promotion (for a given
l e v e lo fe ﬀort), which is also a way to provide incentives in addition to the increase in
performance-pay-sensitivities documented in the previous section.
The net result of all these changes is that total pay increases at the top of the ﬁrm as
a result of more competition, and more so the higher up the executive is in the pay-rank
hierarchy. This complements the results in Revenga (1992), Abowd and Lemieux (1992),
and Abowd and Allain (1996), who analyze workers and ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on total pay
from increasing foreign competition. We ﬁnd that, for the very top executives, compensation
actually may increase, and, thus, inequality within ﬁr m sg o e su p .
4.3 Talent
The previous section suggested that changes in wage diﬀerentials were partly attributable
to ﬁrms hiring workers with diﬀerent talent (measured as the unobserved ﬁxed component
of wages). In this section, we directly evaluate ﬁrms tend to attract, on average, more or
less talented CEOs and executives as import penetration increases. Finding good measures
of executive talent is not straightforward; however, a fairly good proxy for ability can be
derived from the ﬁxed-eﬀects of a wage regression, since they measure the ﬁxed component
of an executive’s pay that is not explained by observables. We model the natural logarithm
of total compensation ln(Wifjt) as a function of some observable variables, time dummies,
an individual ﬁxed eﬀect ηi, and a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect df.




2hk + β3 lnassetsfjt+ dt + df + ηi +  ifjt (4)
In this model, the estimated individual ﬁxed eﬀect b ηi is net of the eﬀect of import penetration
(ImportPenfjt−1), ﬁrm size (lnassetsfjt), position in the ﬁrm’s wage ladder (hk are pay-
rank dummies) and aggregate time eﬀects (dt). It is also net of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, df.32
However, it will include things such as innate talent, ability, and education (not explicitly
32The estimate of the ﬁxed eﬀect is unbiased but inconsistent. This means that it is a measure with
error of the true ηi. Since b ηi is a dependent variable, measurement error will not aﬀect the estimation.
Furthermore, potential heteroskedasticity is allowed for because we use robust and clustered standard errors
(by ﬁrm). Since there are enough individuals changing ﬁrms and ﬁve executives per ﬁrm, individual and
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects can be separately identiﬁed.
19controlled for and arguably constant over time for executives).33 And it may also include
the fact that a speciﬁc managerial job/task becomes increasingly important, and commands
a higher wage premium. With this estimate in hand, we can study how the b ηi of the top ﬁve
executives hired within each ﬁrm (their talent) changes over time, when they are replaced.
So, we can deﬁne b ηikft as the ﬁxed eﬀect estimated for the kth executive of ﬁrm f at time
t and estimate:
b ηikft = λ + γI m p o r t P e n fjt−1 + dt + ukft (5)
where dt are year dummies, and ukft is white noise. Here, the identiﬁcation comes from
ﬁrms that replace their executives over time, from the change in talent from one executive
to his successor. Firm eﬀects are already partialled out in equation 4 and, therefore, the
coeﬃcients in equation 5 are identiﬁed only by ﬁrms that change at least one executive.34
This means that the regressions are likely to have little power, since identiﬁcation comes
only from within-sample movers and must be interpreted with that caveat in mind.
Table 7 presents the results of the talent regressions. Column 1 shows a positive average
eﬀect of import penetration on talent. But this hides substantial heterogeneity in the
response along the wage ladder. Column 2 interacts import penetration with the pay-rank
dummies to show the diﬀerential change in "talent" for each hierarchy level: the diﬀerence
between the highest-paid executive and other executives is signiﬁcantly higher the higher
the level of imports. For the highest-paid executive, the ’talent’ measure increases more
(coeﬃcient of 2.67) than for the lower-ranked executives (0.65 less for the ﬁfth executive).
In the instrumented regressions (columns 3 and 4), we still ﬁnd a larger diﬀerential change
in talent between the ﬁrst and the ﬁfth executive, though also with larger standard errors.35
In sum, we ﬁnd some evidence that the distribution of talent within the ﬁrm changes,
with ﬁrms hiring more talented workers at the top as they face more competition. Therefore,
ﬁrms not only try to elicit more eﬀort from workers through incentives (as shown in Section
4.1), but also pay them more (Section 4.2) and seem to attract more talented workers.
Overall, these results are consistent with the predictions of the model in Marin and Verdier
(2003) and suggest that there may be a war for talent playing out when markets are more
globalized, specially at the very top of the ﬁrm.
33This regression does not include performance, given that if an individual with higher ability leads the
ﬁrm to perform better, we do not want to net this out of our ability estimate.
34The coeﬃcients in column 4 of Table 7 are also identiﬁe db ym o v e r sw i t h i nt h ew a g el a d d e ro ft h eﬁrm.
35Given that talent is measured through its impact on pay, the coeﬃcient γ captures both demand eﬀects,
such as ﬁrms paying more for talent, and supply ones, such as the sorting of more talented executives towards
more competitive industries.
205C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we identify the eﬀects of foreign competition through imports on diﬀerent
aspects of executive pay and the provision of incentives within the ﬁrm. Eliciting the
empirical relationship between competition and the provision of incentives is particularly
important, as the existing theoretical predictions are largely ambiguous, and there is little
evidence that explains the increased use of incentive contracts, for both executives and
workers.
Our results show that, in U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms, increases in foreign competition
lead to lower levels of ﬁxed pay and a higher sensitivity of pay to performance. We estimate
that the increase in import penetration over the studied period implied a 23 percent fall
in the non-performance-related component of compensation and a 3.5 percent increase in
the sensitivity of pay to performance (or 14 percent of the average elasticity). We also
ﬁnd, in contrast to the literature on foreign competition and workers’ wages, that increased
competition is not associated with a consistent decrease in total pay across all executives.
Instead, we observe that total compensation increases particularly for the highest-paid
executives, and that the wage ladder of the ﬁrm becomes steeper; that is, the highest-
paid executives in the ﬁrm tend to earn proportionally more when competition is high,
and inequality within ﬁrms increases. The increase in foreign competition increased overall
executive pay, as well as wage diﬀerentials between executives, with some of this increase
being driven by changes in the composition of top executives. In fact, we ﬁnd some evidence
that higher foreign competition leads to a higher demand for talent, especially at the very
top layers of the ﬁrm hierarchy.
There are certainly other reasons why compensation structures may have changed over
time. We established that one important contributor is the extent of import penetration and
the implied increase in product market competition: as they face more competitive pressure,
ﬁrms demand more talent and are also willing to pay more for "eﬀort." This explains the
use of incentive contracts and also provides a rationale and potential causal explanation for
the increased skewness and polarization of the wage distribution. There are many sources of
increased competition other than foreign competition, and these are possibly contributing
further to the overall change in the wage distribution. Developing our understanding of
these mechanisms further is left to future research.
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6D a t a A p p e n d i x
Execucomp dataset:
The Execucomp database is a panel that records information on at least the top ﬁve
executives of the ﬁrms included in the S&P1500 index from 1992 onwards. We concentrate
on the ﬁrms in industries for which we have import penetration (the manufacturing sector
in 1992-2000). We also restrict the sample to the top ﬁve executives of each ﬁrm (ranked
24by salary-plus-bonus) and drop the observations where there is no information on total pay
received by the executive.
Total Compensation: Sum of salary, bonus, total value of stock options granted (valued
using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total value of restricted stock granted, long-term
incentive payouts and other annual compensation. In real 1996 dollars (Execucomp variable
TDC1).
Firm Performance: Firm performance is measured as the total market value of the
ﬁrm, when this value includes the reinvestment of dividends and excludes mergers, share
buyouts, spin-oﬀs ,a n ds e a s o n e de q u i t yo ﬀerings. Since we take logs and include ﬁxed eﬀects
in our regressions, this is equivalent to using as performance the return to shareholders that
includes the market value of the ﬁrm and the monthly reinvestment of dividends (Computed
from execucomp variables mktval and trs1yr).
Trade Data:
Import Penetration: Import penetration is deﬁned at the industry level (four digit SIC)
as the total value of imports (total import data by SIC4 come from the NBER dataset,
available until 2001) divided by imports plus domestic production (domestic production
is from Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of Manufactures -Statistics for Industry Groups
and Industries- provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and available until 2000)
demeaned at the industry level. Next, for each ﬁrm, we construct weights that correspond
to the fraction of sales associated with each industry (business segments in Compustat)
in which it operated in 1991 (or the ﬁrst year it appears in Compustat if not present in
1991). The ﬁnal import penetration measure is the weighted average of all manufacturing
industries in which the ﬁrm operates in the base year, available for 1992-2000. (Source:
NBER database "US Imports, Exports and Tariﬀ Data, 1989-2001 (NBER 9387)" and
Compustat Segments data)
Tariﬀs: The average tariﬀ measure is deﬁned as the weighted average of the scheduled
tariﬀs imposed by the U.S. on imports to each country, where the weights are the fraction of
imports coming from each country in 1993. Tariﬀs are obtained from the UNCTAD TRAINS
dataset. These are deﬁned by country and six digit HS product code and available for the
U.S. for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000 (year 1997 is imputed from
1996). For each HS6 category, we construct a weighted average of tariﬀs by product, where
the country weights within HS6 are kept constant over time and equal to the base year. To
aggregate the HS6 average tariﬀs to the SIC4 industry level, we use a correspondence and
weight each product by its share in the industry. Tariﬀs are also demeaned and weighted
to obtain the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm e a s u r e .
Exchange rates: The exchange rate index is deﬁned as in Bertrand (2004) at the indus-
try level (three digit SIC code) as the weighted average of the log real exchange rates of
importing countries (expressed in foreign currency per dollar), where the weights are the
share of each foreign country’s import on total imports in a base period (1990-1991). Real
exchange rates are nominal exchange rates multiplied by U.S. Consumer Price Index and
divided by the trading partner CPI. Nominal exchange rates and foreign CPIs are obtained
from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. Exchange rates are also demeaned
and weighted to obtain the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm e a s u r e .
257T a b l e s a n d F i g u r e s
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. 25th Perc. Median 75th Perc. Observations
Total Comp.($1000s) 1668.12 4854.543 446.45 819.5 1658.6 25146
Salary ($1000s) 338.63 211.96 195.17 278.68 414.08 25146
Market Value($1,000,000) 6330.605 2.10E+04 372.26 1025.49 3464.99 25146
ln Tot.Comp 6.809 0.989 6.101 6.709 7.414 25146
ln Performance 7.106 1.708 5.92 6.933 8.15 25146
Import Pen. (raw) 0.156 0.142 0.056 0.125 0.21 25146
Import Pen. 0.003 0.02 -0.007 0 0.011 25146
ln Assets 6.886 1.591 5.778 6.764 7.909 25146
Assets ($1,000,000) 463.392 1.50E+04 323.179 865.799 2720.908 25146
CEO 0.191 0.393 0 0 0 25146
Talent FE 0.002 0.82 -0.482 -0.129 0.347 25146
Lag Exch.rate (raw) 2.225 0.894 1.566 2.231 2.835 18167
Lag Exch.rate 0 0.001 0 0 0.001 18167
Lag Tariﬀ (raw) 0.031 0.06 0.011 0.025 0.04 18167
Lag Tariﬀ 0.195 5.059 -0.232 0.033 0.82 18167
Export Open. (raw) 0.213 0.183 0.078 0.195 0.284 13277
Export Open. 0.013 0.058 0 0.009 0.029 13277
Notes: Total Comp is total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total value of stock
options granted (Black-Scholes valued), total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive
payouts and other annual compensation; ln Performance is the natural log. of shareholders value —
includes the market value of the shares and reinvestment of dividends (in $1000); ln assets measures
ﬁrm size; CEO is an indicator for who is the company CEO; Import. Pen (raw), Lag Tariﬀ (raw)
and Lag Exch. rate (raw) are ﬁrm-speciﬁc weighted averages of the industry measures (import
penetration is imports divided by imports plus domestic production at four digit SIC; tariﬀsa r e
tariﬀs paid by importers; and exchange rates are deﬁned in foreign currency per dollar) where the
weights are the fraction of sales in each of the ﬁrm’s business segments in a base year. Import.
Pen, Lag Tariﬀ a n dL a gE x c h .r a t ea r et h es a m em e a s u r e s ,w h i c hh a v eb e e nd e m e a n e db yi n d u s t r y
ﬁrst (that is why the mean is close to zero). These are the variables actually used in our analysis.
Export Openness is industry exports divided by industry output at four digit SIC, demeaned. See
data appendix for further details and sources.
26Table 2: First stage
Import Pen. Import Pen. Export Open. Import Pen. Import Pen. Import Pen.*lnPerf.
Speciﬁcation Basic Basic Pay-ranks Sensit. FS Sensit. FS
12 3 45 6
Exch.rate -2.476 1.343 -3.19 -2.196 -58.478
[0.925]*** [2.943] [1.464]** [4.289] [27.909]**
Lag Exch.rate -3.664 4.471 -3.299 -1.687 -56.071
[0.933]*** [3.646] [1.410]** [3.888] [24.385]**
Lag Tariﬀ -0.013 -0.001 -0.013 -0.105 -0.162
[0.005]*** [0.001] [0.008]* [0.093] [0.533]
ln Perf. 00 . 0 1 1
[0.001] [0.007]
Exch.rate*ln Perf. -0.088 5.086
[0.522] [3.890]
Lag Exch.rate*ln Perf. -0.211 4.314
[0.472] [3.320]
Lag Tariﬀ*ln Perf. 0.01 0.004
[0.010] [0.060]
Sample ﬁrms ﬁrms all all all all
Firm FE yes yes
Indiv.*Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 3715 3715 13237 18167 18167 18167
R-squared 0.221 0.214 0.03 0.208 0.208 0.222
Shea R-squared 0.002 0.024 0.08 0.149
F-test of excl. instr. 1.9 2.64** 2.68*** 4.77***
Anderson-Rubin F 5.66** 5.3*** 4.88*** 4.88***
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.49 0.42 0.42 0.42
Notes: Std. errors clustered by ﬁrm in columns 4 to 6. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Import Penetration is
Imports divided by Imports plus domestic production at four digit SIC, demeaned and weighted at the ﬁrm level, where
weights take into account the sectors of operation of the ﬁrm in a base year. Export Openness is industry exports divided
by industry output at four digit SIC, demeaned. Performance is total shareholders’ return, including shareholders’ value at
ﬁscal year end plus reinvestment of dividends. All regressions control for year dummies, ln assets and a CEO dummy. See
Table 1 and data appendix for further details and sources.
27Table 3: Pay Structure: Performance-related-pay
Dependent variable is ln Tot. Comp.
CEOs CEOs
123456 7
ln Perf. 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.32
[0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.03]***
Lag Import Pen. -3.4 -4.38 -4.49 -3.23 -4.54 -7.21 -10.25
[1.90]* [1.68]*** [1.71]*** [1.72]* [1.98]** [2.40]*** [3.66]***
Lag Import Pen.*lnPerf. 0.73 0.85 0.86 0.59 0.81 1.26 1.6
[0.26]*** [0.24]*** [0.24]*** [0.25]** [0.29]*** [0.33]*** [0.54]***
ln assets 0.21 0.15 0.1 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.25
[0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.04]** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
CEO 0.86 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
[0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]***
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm FE yes
Indiv.*Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Indust.dummies*lnPerf yes yes yes
Year dummies*lnPerf. yes yes yes
Ind.dummies*Year*lnPerf yes yes
Observations 25146 25146 24543 25146 25146 4812 4812
R-squared 0.37 0.23 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.39
Notes: Std. errors clustered by ﬁrm in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The dependent variable is
the log of total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total value of stock options granted (at Black-Scholes),
total value of restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensation; Performance is total
shareholders’ return, including shareholders, value at ﬁscal year end plus reinvestment of dividends; Import Penetration
is Imports divided by Imports plus domestic production at four digit SIC, demeaned and weighted at the ﬁrm level,
where weights take into account the sectors of operation of the ﬁrm in a base year; ln assets measures ﬁrm size; CEO is
an indicator for who is the company CEO. See data appendix for further details and sources.
28Table 4: Pay Structure: IV Results
Dependent variable is ln Tot. Comp.
O L S I VI V I V I VI VI V
OLSsample CEOs CEOs
1 23 4 567
ln Perf. 0.24 0.21 0.26
[0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.04]***
Lag Import Pen. -3.62 -1.8 -15.6 -10.82 -31.26 -6.72 -18.33
[1.74]** [8.25] [9.08]* [11.44] [13.03]** [10.54] [13.75]
Lag Import Pen.*lnPerf. 0.73 2.37 4.21 3.93 5.91 2.97 5.04
[0.24]*** [0.86]*** [1.66]** [1.86]** [2.59]** [1.15]** [2.17]**
ln assets 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.26
[0.03]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]***
CEO 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26
[0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.04]***
Instruments: all all all exch.rates tariﬀsa l l a l l
Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiv.*Firm Fixed Eﬀects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indust.dummies*lnPerf yes yes yes
Year dummies*lnPerf. yes yes yes
Industry trends yes yes yes
Indust.dummies*lnPerf*trend yes yes yes
Observations 18167 18167 18167 18167 18167 3685 3685
R-squared 0.18
Notes: Std. errors clustered by ﬁrm in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. These are two-stage least
squares regressions of Table 3 where Lag Import Penetration and its interaction with Performance are instrumented
with (lagged and double-lagged) exchange rates and lagged tariﬀs (see Table 2, columns 5 and 6, for the ﬁrst-stage
results). The dependent variable is the log of total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total value
of stock options granted (valued using the standard Black-Scholes formula), total value of restricted stock granted,
long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensation; Performance is total shareholders’ return, including
shareholders’ value at ﬁscal year end plus reinvestment of dividends; Import Penetration is imports divided by
Imports plus domestic production at four digit SIC, demeaned and weighted at the ﬁrm level, where weights take
into account the sectors of operation of the ﬁrm in a base year; ln assets measures ﬁrm size; CEO is an indicator for
who is the company CEO. See data appendix for further details and sources.
29Table 5: Promotion and Wage Ladders
Dependent variable is ln Tot. Comp.
IV IV IV IV
12345678
Import Pen. 2.33 1.7 0.72 1.9 15.74 9.43 17.92 10.89
[0.70]*** [0.70]** [0.70] [0.84]** [6.25]** [5.38]* [6.34]*** [5.20]**
Second*Lag Imp.Pen. -0.66 0.58 0.71 -0.21 -4.02 -3.93 -0.33 -0.61
[0.49] [0.54] [0.53] [0.63] [2.22]* [2.22]* [2.68] [2.54]
Third*Lag Imp.Pen -1.21 -0.32 -0.06 -0.87 -5.93 -5.87 -6.8 -6.13
[0.52]** [0.57] [0.55] [0.65] [2.19]*** [2.18]*** [2.39]*** [2.23]***
Fourth*Lag Imp.Pen. -1.25 -0.37 -0.27 -0.89 -7.04 -6.88 -5.72 -4.87
[0.53]** [0.57] [0.57] [0.68] [2.27]*** [2.26]*** [2.67]** [2.53]*
Fifth*Lag Imp.Pen -1.31 -0.78 -0.39 -0.78 -7.6 -7.62 -1.46 -1.35
[0.59]** [0.67] [0.68] [0.73] [2.47]*** [2.47]*** [2.92] [2.66]
Second -0.55 -0.37 -0.37 -0.57 -0.54 -0.54 -0.35 -0.35
[0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]***
Third -0.88 -0.59 -0.59 -0.89 -0.86 -0.86 -0.54 -0.54
[0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]***
Fourth -1.08 -0.74 -0.73 -1.09 -1.05 -1.05 -0.7 -0.69
[0.01]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
Fifth -1.27 -0.88 -0.88 -1.29 -1.24 -1.24 -0.86 -0.85
[0.01]*** [0.03]*** [0.03]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.02]*** [0.04]*** [0.04]***
Y e a r D u m m i e s y e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e sy e s y e s
Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Indiv.*Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Industry*Year yes yes yes
Observations 25146 25146 25146 18167 18122 18122 18167 18167
Number of ﬁrms 831 831 831 798 798 798 798 798
Number of Individuals 7571 7571 7571
R-squared 0.52 0.27 0.31 0.51
Notes: Std. errors clustered by ﬁrm in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. lnTotal Comp. is the log of
total yearly compensation that includes salary, bonus, total Black-Scholes value of stock options granted, total value of
restricted stock granted, long-term incentive payouts and other annual compensation; Second is a dummy that records
the second most highly paid executive, third is the third most highly paid, etc. (corresponding to dummies h1 to h5).
The base category is the most highly paid executive in the ﬁrm. Import Penetration is imports divided by Imports
plus domestic production at four digit SIC, demeaned and deﬁned at the ﬁrm level. All regressions include ln assets as
control. Columns 5 to 8 are two-stage least squares regressions where Lag. Import Penetration and its interaction with
the hierarchy dummies are instrumented with (lagged and double lagged) exchange rates and lagged tariﬀs. The ﬁrst
stage can be seen in in Table 3 column 4. See data appendix for further details and sources.
30Table 6: Promotion and Wage Ladders
ln TotComp ln TotComp
12
ln Perf. 0.25 0.27
[0.02]*** [0.02]***
Second*ln Perf. -0.02 -0.03
[0.01]*** [0.01]***
Third*ln Perf. -0.03 -0.05
[0.01]*** [0.01]***
Fourth*ln Perf. -0.03 -0.05
[0.01]*** [0.01]***
Fifth*ln Perf. -0.03 -0.05
[0.01]*** [0.01]***
Lag Import Pen. -4.92 -6.1
[2.46]** [2.53]**
Second*Lag Imp.Pen. 1.29 2.6
[2.44] [2.59]
Third*Lag Imp.Pen 2.56 3.76
[2.19] [2.59]
Fourth*Lag Imp.Pen. 3.74 3.26
[2.23]* [2.48]
Fifth*Lag Imp.Pen 4.7 7.33
[2.48]* [3.47]**
Lag Import Pen.*lnPerf. 1.06 1.12
[0.34]*** [0.34]***
Second*Lag Imp.Pen.*lnPerf. -0.27 -0.29
[0.33] [0.36]
Third*Lag Imp.Pen*lnPerf. -0.54 -0.55
[0.30]* [0.35]
Fourth*Lag Imp.Pen.*lnPerf. -0.72 -0.52
[0.31]** [0.34]
Fifth*Lag Imp.Pen*lnPerf. -0.87 -1.15
[0.36]** [0.47]**





Number of Individuals 7571 7571
Notes: Std. errors clustered by ﬁrm in brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at
5%; *** at 1%. Regressions include controls for ln assets, pay-rank dummies.
All variables are deﬁned as in Table 6. See data appendix for further details
and sources.
31Table 7: Talent regressions
Talent Talent Talent Talent
IV IV
12 3 4
Lag Import Pen. 1.99 2.67 35.06 38.24
[1.08]* [1.16]** [15.18]** [14.82]***
Second*Lag Imp.Pen. -0.95 -3.09
[0.37]*** [1.79]*
Third*Lag Imp.Pen -1.01 -3.16
[0.40]** [1.92]
Fourth*Lag Imp.Pen. -0.96 -4.65
[0.42]** [2.12]**










Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Indiv*Firm FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 25146 25146 18167 18167
R-squared 0 0.03
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis and clustered by ﬁrm in
brackets. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. The dependent
variable is the estimated individual ﬁxed eﬀect from a ﬁrst-stage regres-
sion of log of total pay on ﬁrm size, hierarchy, year and ﬁrm dummies
(see equation 4). Import Penetration is imports divided by imports
plus domestic production at four digit SIC, demeaned and deﬁned at
the ﬁrm level. Second is a dummy that records the second most highly
paid executive, third is the third most highly paid, etc. (correspond-
i n gt od u m m i e sh1 to h5). See data appendix for further details and
sources.























1992 1994 1996 1998 2000
year
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 3674 Semiconductors
3714 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessories





































Average tariff (Sample Mean: 0.03 Std.Dev: 0.08
Within firm SD: 0.058 Betw.SD: 0.051)
33